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An Assessment of Monetary Policy Response To
Capital Inflows in Nigeria1
Usman M. Okpanachi2
Large and persistent capital inflows can be a double-edged sword. Accompanying its
many attractions is the tendency to display a boom and bust pattern (volatility and
reversals) in addition to the possibility of causing rapid exchange rate appreciation,
inflation and loss of monetary policy independence. These downside risks create very
strong impetus for some sort of policy response like sterilization, fiscal consolidation
or controls. This study employs a simple analytical framework to estimate the
intensity (and effectiveness) of monetary sterilization by the Central Bank of Nigeria
(CBN) in response to increased capital inflows in recent years. The study finds
evidence of less-than-full, but significantly high sterilization intensity, albeit no
indication of sterilization smoothing by the Bank. The paper reports also, evidence of
slacking sterilization over time, attributable in part to cost and financial system
stability considerations. Rising cost of sterilization, especially, could soon undermine
the sustainability of the current approach, predicated on a heavy reliance on market
operations, should inflows of the magnitudes observed in the past persist. The
situation calls for adoption of supplementary measures.

Keywords: Capital inflows; monetary policy; sterilization; sterilization index;
sterilization intensity; Nigeria.
JEL Classification: E52, F21, F32
1.0

Introduction

The basic macroeconomic framework of an open economy suggests that
external capital financing (whether in the form of foreign direct investment
(FDI), portfolio (equity) investment, external debt or any combination thereof)
is warranted by the existence of gap between domestic savings and
investment. Historically, all the three kinds of external finance have featured
1
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simultaneously as sources of financing for developing countries. External
debt, in particular, became a highly problematic source for many developing
countries especially in the 1980s as debt levels became unsustainable and
were blamed for the wide-spread macroeconomic imbalances during the
period. However, two decades on, particularly as from 2004, external debt in
the portfolio of external financing sources of many countries has tended to
diminish in prominence owing to the wave of massive debt cancellations that
blew across the highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and some low-income
countries as part of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank poverty reduction/debt cancellation initiatives. Nigeria also benefited
from the initiative.
In the last few years, Nigeria has experienced a phenomenal increase in
private inflows. Key triggers included the increased tempo of reform which
led to a more stable financial system and better macroeconomic environment.
More fundamentally, financial developments at the world stage might also
have played quite an important role. The fact that the less developed
economies were by and large less integrated with the rest of the world, or
were thought to be relatively insulated from the crises that engulfed major
financial centers made them appear like „temporary safe havens‟ for
international capital. Bolstered by the oligopolistic nature of markets in such
economies, capital flows to them rapidly increased in 2000s to take advantage,
also, of the persistent uncovered interest differentials. For instance, capital
flows to the sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) increased from about $10 billion in
2000 to over $50 billion in 2007. Nigeria received nearly 30% of the FDI
component of the inflows (IMF-REO, 2008).
Until the 2000s, foreign direct investments (FDIs) and debt were the major
kinds of inflows to Nigeria. However, as the capital market opened up, the
country started to receive substantial inflows in the form of portfolio
investment especially from 2004. Both the bonds and equities segments of the
market have in recent years experienced unprecedented inflows. As the global
financial and economic crisis intensified, inflows slightly recessed as from
mid-2008 but picked in 2010 (Figure 1). Overall, total new capital inflows
have remained higher in the last five years relative to the past.
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Figure 1: Private Capital inflows to Nigeria, 2004-2011

Source: CBN Annual Report (several editions)
Discussions and debates about the consequences of, and policy responses to
private capital flows have remained alive, and easily refreshed in terms of
vigour by any fresh episode of financial or currency crisis. The 2007/2008
financial systems crises have rekindled interest in this subject. Of course, as
the debate goes on, country case examinations would continue to prove
essential, throwing more light on the issues and improving understanding of
the nexus among capital inflows, macroeconomic balance and policy
response. Such examinations are more urgently desirable for low-income
countries, many of which have becomes more important destinations for
international capital and which are at the same time often less prepared to
handle some of the adverse consequences of inflow surge like real currency
appreciation, inflation and sudden stops or reversals.
Central banks directly or indirectly play crucial roles in either lessening the
impact of large inflows or in preventing the associated risks from crystalizing.
They do so using monetary policy mainly. This is justified by the fact that
inflows could lead to rapid deterioration of monetary and financial conditions
and thereby make their task of ensuring price stability harder. The Central
Bank of Nigeria (CBN) is the sole monetary authority in Nigeria, and
conducts monetary policy with a considerable degree of autonomy. The
Bank‟s monetary policy is tailored towards ensuring price stability, among
other objectives. In doing so it has adopted, since 1974, the monetary
targeting framework which basically relies on the assumption of a stable
relationship between money and prices (CBN, 2007). Over time, some

78

An Assessment of Monetary Policy Response to
Capital Inflows in Nigeria

Okpanachi

refinements in the way monetary policy is conducted have taken place. It has
moved from the initial regime of direct controls to the use of indirect or
market-based instruments in the last two decades, even though the basic
framework of targeting monetary aggregates has not changed.
In addition to signaling the direction policy (using its policy rate3) to rein in
inflation expectations, the CBN uses reserve requirements, and conducts
regular open market operations (OMOs) to ensure optimal liquidity at all
times. Capital inflows increase domestic liquidity by increasing foreign assets
of the banking system with the effect of increasing pressure on domestic
prices. Therefore, the liquidity management operations of the CBN, especially
the mop-up actions, can be thought of as a form of response to inflows. It,
however, needs to be seen from the analysis in subsequent sections of this
paper whether this response has been systematic and effective overall. Against
the foregoing background, this paper investigates sterilization responses to
increased capital inflow in Nigeria. Specifically, the paper examines how the
CBN has attempted to insulate domestic monetary conditions, or in narrow
sense, liquidity, from the expansionary effect of capital inflows and how
effective this has been.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the literature on
consequences of large and persistent inflows and policy responses. Section
three focuses on methodology and the analytical framework of the study. The
main findings of the study are presented and discussed in section four. Section
five presents some reflections on policy implications of the findings while
section six concludes the paper.
2.0

Literature Review

In the 1990s considerable research effort was directed at re-interrogating the
standard economic wisdom that investment finance, on net, should flow from
North to South, i.e., from countries with abundance of capital to those in dare
need of same due to their relatively low domestic savings. In what is
commonly referred to as the „paradox of capital‟, it is agreed today, that the
flow of financial resources has not always obeyed this simple rule of logic as a
3

The CBN used as policy rate, the “Minimum Rediscount Rate” (MRR) up to 2006 when it
changed to the current Monetary Policy Rate (MPR), supported by a standing lending/deposit
facility.
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general rule. As Lucas (1990) and many other studies have shown, there has
been, instead, considerable “uphill” flow of financial resources, a pattern
which is unlikely to change even in the present era of „horse race‟ financial
globalization. Goswami et al. (2007) outlined its features to include the fact
that gross capital flows have expanded rapidly since 1995 from roughly 3.0
per cent to about 15.0 per cent of world GDP in 2005; and that emerging
countries have become key providers of capital to mature markets,
paradoxically. By the end of 2010, gross capital flows had risen to about 17
percent of world output (IMF-REO, 2011).
The empirical literature suggests that external capital does not simply flow in
reaction to investment opportunity as measured by the magnitude of the
financing gap or the current account deficit alone. International investors
typically factor-in exit potentials/strategies in their decision to move into any
economy. In this regard, a country‟s current earning and also the size of its
official reserves matter a great deal. It is a measure of confidence in the
economy and obviously offers some kind of unwritten guarantee that the
exchange rate can be reasonably defended against wild swings over the shortterm. Apparently, increased domestic savings and comparatively impressive
growth are important attractions for private capital inflows. Typically,
arbitrage opportunities and prospects for quick capital gains emerge and are
often inadvertently protected by the weak regulatory environment (often
presenting as poor or absence of market regulating institutions). In the
circumstance, short-term capital flows are attracted by such opportunities high returns on equities, high interest rates, exchange rate appreciation, etc.
Given the very wide nature of the subject of inflow and the vastness of
research on the subject, the temptation to drift a review of the literature far
afield is always strong. To avoid this, the rest of the literature review is
structured around two aspects that are more relevant to the particular
questions this paper seeks to answer.
2.1

Consequences of large and persistent inflows

Opinions on the growth benefits of financial integration commonly measured
by aggregate financial liabilities (size of external debt, FDI and portfolio
investment) have continued differ. In fact, increased capital inflow can be a
double-edged sword. Whereas some scholars including Stiglitz (2002) view
unfettered capital flows as unhealthy and disruptive, others have argued that
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increased openness to capital flows has aided some low-income countries to
move to middle income status. Bernanke (2005) wrote:
“The free movement of capital across borders has created, and will
certainly continue to create, enormous economic benefits. Capital
flows afford developing countries and other regions the means to
exploit promising investment opportunities while providing savers
around the globe the means both to earn higher returns and to reduce
risk through international portfolio diversification. Access to
international capital markets also permits nations to accumulate
foreign assets in good times and to deplete those assets or to borrow
in bad times, mitigating the effects on living standards of shocks to
domestic income and production” (p. 1)

Fears about increased flows to developing countries have been commonly
associated with the potentials for rapid real exchange rate appreciation,
current accounts deterioration, inflation, loss of monetary policy independence
and, more crucially, “sudden stops” or flow reversals and the often attendant
financial crisis. The tendency of inflows to display a boom and bust pattern is
particularly the policy makers‟ nightmare. Some analyses have even
questioned the ability of financial systems in developing countries in
particular to handle efficiently huge and persistent private inflows, leading to
the insinuation that large inflows may threaten financial stability (Bercuson
and Koeing, 1993). Spiegel (1995) has suggested that large and volatile flows
could trigger or exacerbate financial system instability by causing large
swings in bank liquidity. This could lead to what Calvo, Leiderma and
Reinhart (1993) have referred to as “improper intermediation” a situation in
which, for example, banks become overly exposed to markets such as real
estate and equities, which are highly prone to speculative burbles.
The experiences of countries like Mexico, Argentina and some East Asian
nations in the 1980s and second half of the 1990s are quick reference points to
the dangers associated with surges in inflows. Those reference points
notwithstanding, Kose et al. (2007) noted that attempts at studying the
manifestations have failed to show evidence that those countries which are
more open to financial flows have a higher tendency of experiencing crises
than otherwise. Yet, the possibilities of adverse consequences create very
strong impetus for some sort of policy interventions when an economy is
faced with huge and persistent capital inflows.
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Policy responses to large inflows

Policy interventions are called up to mitigate the so called negative
consequences of large inflows while reinforcing their beneficial effects. In the
literature, four broad spectrums of policy interventions are easily discernible –
fiscal retrenchment, capital controls and exchange rate flexibility and
monetary sterilization (Cardarelli et al., 2009; Lee, 1997). Fiscal retrenchment
has been used by some countries to mitigate the impact huge inflows. The idea
is that reducing government expenditure (contractionary fiscal policy stance)
would have a countervailing effect on aggregate domestic liquidity when
inflows are on the increase. Liquidity-driven consequences like inflation and
real exchange rate appreciation are thereby avoided.
A flexible exchange rate can act as a shock absorber in times of large and
persistent inflows. The automatic nature of adjustment helps to contain many
of the adverse impacts of inflows. A flexible exchange rate may, however,
have some negative repercussions for trade especially owing to its tendency to
become more volatile when left to the whims and caprices of the market (Rose
2000; Klien and Shambaugh 2004). This is linked to what is commonly
referred to as fear of floating4, the reason countries are either unwilling to
float or doing so only slowly (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000). However,
proponents of flexible exchange rates as an appropriate mechanism for dealing
with huge inflows (for example, Bernanke, 2005) do admit that a flexible
exchange rate could exhibit significant volatility in the short run, but that such
is unlikely to affect trade substantially since they are easily hedged.
Controls on capital flows as a response, though losing relevance and
popularity remains (potentially) the most direct way to avoid undesirable
inflows, especially of short-term nature, which often easily become
speculative. There are usually varying degrees of control on capital and
policy measures for ensuring control. Among developing countries,
especially, control more commonly seek to achieve tow ends: slow capital
repatriation or flow reversals and prevent hot money. Capital control measures
could range from minimum (allowable) investment tenor specified to
exclusion of certain assets category from foreign investor the shop list. In
Nigeria, until 2011, foreign investors could not subscribe to Nigerian treasury
4

It is the view that high exchange rate volatility could harm a country by translating to
instability in consumer prices and/or by raising the value of foreign liabilities in the event of a
sharp devaluation.
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bills (NTBs) of less than one year tenor. When used for a long period, capital
controls tend to inhibit growth particularly for a country that seriously needs
external capital.
As noted previously, capital inflows translate to increases in domestic
liquidity with (potential) negative consequences including inflation to which
the central bank must respond. Monetary policy response typically takes the
form of monetary (reserves) sterilization. Sterilization in this context refers to
the attempt by the central bank to attenuate the effects of increased capital
inflows on system‟s liquidity and monetary conditions in general, by
depressing the domestic asset through market operations or by some other
means. This is commonly achieved either by increasing the required reserve
ratio or through the sale of financial securities (open market operations).
Often, central banks use both.
Theoretically, the two operations work through a consequential reduction in
system liquidity (money supply) from the domestic credit side thereby
counteracting the inflow-induced expansion of system liquidity from foreign
assets side. This effect is demonstrated by a backward shift of the LM
function. Also, as bank loans become more expensive, particularly if the nonbank financial sector is not in the position to substitute formal intermediation,
investment reduces (through a cut back in credit) as in the augmented
Bernanke-Blinder IS-LM model (Bernanke and Blinder, 1987).
Of the four options for managing inflows identified earlier, only fiscal policy
is completely outside the purview of the central bank. Capital controls,
exchange rate flexibility and monetary sterilization, are within the central
bank‟s administrative and technical reach and control. Until 2011, the CBN
for example, used regulations to block inflow of some categories of foreign
capital. However, owing to the country‟s commitments under Article 8 of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), among other considerations, the Bank has
not been able to use stricter measures of control on capital in recent years.
There are indications, nonetheless, that monetary management policies of the
Bank have taken into account the surge in inflows in recent years. With regard
to monetary sterilization, Figure 2 shows the net domestic assets (NDA) and
net foreign assets (NFA) side-by-side. The opposing appearances of the two
aggregates especially as from 2004 suggest some deliberate sterilization by
the CBN. This is further investigated in the subsequent sections of this paper.
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Figure 2: Net Domestic Asset and Net Foreign Asset, 2000-2011
Sources: 1. CBN Annual Report (several editions), 2. CBN Statistical Bulletin
(several editions)

3.0

Methodology

3.1.

Which model type is ideal?

The central research question of this paper is: To what extent has the CBN
attempted to insulate domestic monetary conditions from the effects of the
increased inflows to Nigeria since 2004? In other words, how has the CBN
ensured monetary stability in the face of the recent surge in capital inflows to
Nigeria?
From the literature, three main classes of models have been used to answer
similar questions, i.e., to analyze the monetary policy responses to increased
capital inflows, in a number of countries, especially, for some Latin America
and Asian countries. They are the multi-equation model; vector autoregression (VAR) and simple linear model. Each of these has its strengths and
weaknesses. Studies which are based on VARs and other multi-equation
models typically endogenize capital flows (e.g Christensen 2004) and other
variables that may not in reality belong to the system (Kwack 2001, Glick and
Hutchison, 2000). Besides, these models require lengthier data points to
accommodate more degrees of freedom. Problem of multicollinearity easily
creeps in, in multi-equations models particularly if foreign asset and a
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measure of sterilization are included – both are often highly correlated. Due to
these limitations the simple equation model estimated using the ordinary least
squares (OLS) has gained greater popularity with studies that either partly of
fully focused on the monetary policy response to inflows5. This model type
(and the OLS estimation technique) is used in this study following Cavoli and
Rajan (2005); Glick (2008); Glick and Hutchison (1994); Kwack (1994) and
Fane (2000). As has been elaborated in the previous section, monetary policy
response typically takes the form of sterilization, an attempt by monetary
authorities to depress domestic assets when confronted with large and
persistent flows6. These studies attempted to determine the occurrence and
intensity of sterilization over time. The OLS estimation technique enables
direct extraction of the sterilization indices from estimated slope coefficients
of the model.
3.2

Analytical framework

We begin from the basic premise that the CBN like every other central bank
acts in some ways (systematized or not) to offset the inflows-induced rise in
foreign assets by depressing domestic assets in order to ensure monetary
stability. Such an action, irrespective of the way it is done, is referred to as
sterilization. The basic premise for modeling sterilization operations of a
monetary authority is the simple identity that states that the monetary base is
the sum of net foreign assets (NFA) and net domestic assets (NDA)
subsequently denoted as simply F and D, respectively. A change in the
monetary base (∆H) is traceable to one of three possibilities: a change in net
foreign assets (∆F), a change in net domestic assets (∆D) or a change in both
classes of assets.
(1a)
(1b)
(2)
5

6

See for example, Cavoli and Rajan (2005) and Glick (2008)

Sterilization is done either by the usual open market sales of financial securities;
increase in reserve requirements to depress the money multiplier or by some
unorthodox means like withdrawal of public deposits from DMBs
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If we assume that the CBN sterilizes completely an increase in foreign assets,
then:
(3a)
Or,
(3b)
Equation 3b implies that the derivative of D with respect to F is (-1). If we
denote this derivative by φ, we may then rewrite (3b) as:
(4)
Therefore, φ is a measure of the extent to which the CBN attempts to insulate
domestic liquidity from the direct impact of increases in foreign assets. To
assess the magnitude or extent of sterilization operations, we follow Cavoli
and Rajan (2005), Glick (2008) and Cardarelli et al. (2009), to specify the
following linear relationship between net domestic assets and net foreign
assets:
(5)
where;
assets.

is change in net domestic assets and

is change in net foreign

The slope of equation 5
is actually the measure of sterilization7. When
multiplied by (-1), we have the sterilization index (Cardarelli et al., 2009). It
follows that a sterilization index equal to unity (1) means that the central bank
is able to fully offset the rise in foreign asset8. Conversely, a sterilization
index equal to zero (0) means the central bank does not attempt to sterilize at
all. The latter is a highly unlikely scenario because large and persistent
inflows typically compel defensive monetary policy actions by central banks
to retain control over liquidity and monetary conditions. It is therefore more
7

Apriori, φ should be less than zero. If it is exactly -1, then the monetary authority
has sterilized fully; less than -1 signifies over sterilization.
8

From the study by Cavoli and Rajan (2005) the index for Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Philippines during 1990 – 1997 when these countries experienced large
inflows ranged from 0.77 to 0.98. This study also found incidence of oversterilization in Korea (1.11) over the same sample period
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plausible to expect the sterilization index to be greater than zero but less than
one9.
Equation 5 captures only contemporaneous adjustment in domestic assets, it
does not address the possibility that the monetary authority undertakes to
more gradually adjust it in view of expansion in net foreign assets (F) or
correct itself in subsequent period if it perceives under or over-sterilization in
an earlier period (sterilization smoothing). Following Cavioli and Rajan
(2005), we are able to ameliorate this limitation by including a one-period
lagged (F) as in equation 6.
(6)
A significant
evidences sterilization smoothing. If,
, the monetary
authority is correcting a perceived over sterilization while if,
, it may
be interpreted that the monetary authority is attempting to sterilize inflow
(gradually) over two periods.
Strictly speaking, equations 5 and 6 enable us to assess sterilization in a
narrow context. Since the CBN could also sterilize increases in NFA using
some other means, for example, raising the reserve requirement10, it makes
sense to consider, as well, a broader measure of domestic liquidity. Rather
than the change in NDA, we investigate the change in broad money supply,
M2, in the case of Nigeria, with respect to changes in the net foreign assets.
Hence:
(7)
Equation 7 may be modified to take account of possible sterilization
smoothing by the CBN as in equation 8.
(8)
9

It is understood that that even under such circumstances as full sterilization,
domestic credit or money supply could change, but in response to other exogenous
variables like expected inflation and output gap and not to balance of payment
movements
10

Raising reserve requirements of the banking system decreases the money multiplier
with an attendant depressing effect on money supply
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Sterilization in this case is full if a central bank is able to completely prevent
inflow-induced increases in base money from increasing the money supply by,
for example, raising reserve requirements which then alters the money
multiplier. In the circumstance, (or in equation 8) is zero. On the contrary
if base money fluctuations are completely transmitted to the money supply,
then is 1 (any increase in net inflow is reflected in an equal increase in
money supply). Both extremes are, however, rare in reality. We assume
therefore that:
.
3.3

Data and sources

The study utilized monthly series from 2000 to 2011on inflows, exchange
rate, treasury bills rate, and various monetary aggregates. The data were
obtained mainly from Central Bank of Nigeria sources, including various
editions of the Annual Report, Statistical Bulletin, Monetary Policy Review
and the Bank‟s Half-Year Report.
4.0

Results and Analysis

4.1

Overall monetary policy response to capital inflows

The assessment in this paper focuses on the sterilization response of the
Central Bank of Nigeria to the inflow of foreign capital. We first estimate four
equations (5, 6, 7 and 8) using the ordinary least squares estimation technique.
The results are presented in Tables 1 – 4.
The returned (slope) coefficients from for equations 5 and 6 above are
presented in Tables 1 – 4. In assessing these results we note that the adjusted
R-square is low suggesting possible under-specification of our model, which
could be ameliorated by introducing additional variables on the right-hand
side of the model. However, doing so could further complicate matters as
candidate variables are likely to be highly correlated with net foreign asset,
and may therefore soak-up part of the monetary sterilization response to
inflows. In the circumstance, estimated coefficients of change in net foreign
asset would no longer be full measures of monetary sterilization. On this note,
we admit the low coefficient of determination as a limitation of this study. A
general note of caution is that these results should not be interpreted as
evidencing causation, in fact that‟s not the purpose of the models; instead they
only offer us slope coefficients for the computation of sterilization indices.
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Table 1: Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: DNDA

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

DNFA

-0.691119

0.068918

-10.02820

0.0000

C

69884.10

20221.10

3.455999

0.0007

R-squared

0.425104

Mean dependent var

35852.47

Adjusted R-squared

0.420877

S.D. dependent var

307719.7

S.E. of regression

234175.1

Akaike info criterion

27.57991

Sum squared resid

7.46E+12

Schwarz criterion

27.62234

Log likelihood

-1901.014

Hannan-Quinn criter.

27.59715

Durbin-Watson stat

2.109121

F-statistic

100.5647

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000000

Table 2: Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: DNDA

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

DNFA

-0.689134

0.071837

-9.593079

0.0000

DNFA(-1)

0.007799

0.075209

0.103700

0.9176

C

69623.24

20837.46

3.341255

0.0011

R-squared

0.425086

Mean dependent var

36204.30

Adjusted R-squared

0.416505

S.D. dependent var

308821.1

S.E. of regression

235898.7

Akaike info criterion

27.60185

Sum squared resid

7.46E+12

Schwarz criterion

27.66579

Log likelihood

-1887.727

Hannan-Quinn criter.

27.62783

Durbin-Watson stat

2.105931

F-statistic

49.53912

Prob(F-statistic)

0.000000

First, these results suggest that the CBN systematically responded to the surge
in inflows through offsetting reductions in domestic assets between (NDA)
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during the sample period with estimated sterilization index of 0.69 in Table 1.
Second, we found no direct evidence of an attempt by the CBN to smoothen
sterilization over time as the estimate of φ2 in equation 8 reported on Table 2,
(i.e., 0.0077) is statistically insignificant.
The observed sterilization intensity (0.69) is, however, lower than those
estimated by other studies for a number of countries during similar episodes of
huge inflows in the past. For example, Cavoli and Rajan (2005) reported 1.1,
0.91, 0.77, 0.94 and 0.98, respectively, for Korea, Thailand, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Philippines in the period 1990 -1997.
Next we turn to the broader measure of domestic liquidity, money supply
(M2). Our estimates of equations 7 and 8 are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 3: Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: DM2
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

DNFA
C

0.308106
69922.26

0.068719
20162.76

4.483583
3.467891

0.0000
0.0007

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.128778
0.122372
233499.4
7.41E+12
-1900.615
20.10251
0.000015

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

85093.82
249247.3
27.57413
27.61656
27.59137
2.108228

Table 4: Estimation Results
Dependent Variable: DM2
Variable

Coefficient

Std. Error

t-Statistic

Prob.

DNFA
DNFA(-1)
C

0.310621
0.009958
69544.75

0.071627
0.074990
20776.80

4.336618
0.132797
3.347231

0.0000
0.8946
0.0011

R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
S.E. of regression
Sum squared resid
Log likelihood
F-statistic
Prob(F-statistic)

0.128939
0.115938
235212.0
7.41E+12
-1887.327
9.917714
0.000096

Mean dependent var
S.D. dependent var
Akaike info criterion
Schwarz criterion
Hannan-Quinn criter.
Durbin-Watson stat

85172.86
250160.2
27.59602
27.65996
27.62200
2.104005
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The slope coefficients from equations 7 and 8 are, in general, consistent with
those obtained from equations 5 and 6. Sterilization intensity here is (1minus
estimate of β in equation 7 or 1 minus estimate of β1 in equation 8). Increases
in foreign assets are transmitted to money supply at less than full (β = 0.31).
The balance (0.69) is neutralized through the sterilizing actions of the CBN
which results in depressing the domestic credit. It follows that the
sterilization index is (0.69). The results reported in Table 4 validate our earlier
finding that there was no attempt at smoothening sterilization over time as the
estimate of β2 (i.e., 0099) was found to be statistically insignificant.
4.2

Inter-temporal assessment of monetary policy Response

Sterilization coefficients for all the rolling regressions were statistically
significant, implying that the CBN sustained some level of sterilization
throughout the sample period (2000-2011), even as intensities differed. The
sterilization indices reported in Table 5 were computed simply by multiplying
by (-1) the slope coefficients of the linear relation between changes in NDA
and NFA (equation 5).
Table5: 48-month Rolling Regression Results and Sterilisation Indices
commencing 2000M01
Regression End Period Coefficient (φ) S Index ( | |)
2003M12
2004M06
2004M12
2005M06
2005M12
2006M06
2006M12
2007M06
2007M12
2008M06
2008M12
2009M06
2009M12
2010M06
2010M12
2011M06

(0.77)
(0.78)
(0.81)
(0.75)
(0.88)
(0.65)
(0.58)
(0.66)
(0.75)
(0.69)
(0.60)
(0.65)
(0.59)
(0.60)
(0.61)
(0.66)

Source: Author‟s computation

0.77
0.78
0.81
0.75
0.88
0.65
0.58
0.66
0.75
0.69
0.6
0.65
0.59
0.6
0.61
0.66
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The indices provide information with which to gauge adjustments to the
tempo of sterilisation activity by the CBN during the period. It is interesting to
view the changing magnitude of sterilization interventions by the CBN in
response to increased inflows. A key finding here is that the intensity of
monetary sterilisation has varied during the sample period (Table 5). The
numbers suggest that up to 2005, the CBN maintained a relatively high tempo
of sterilization but slowed significantly thereafter as inflows grew even more
rapidly from 2006. Sometime between the second half of 2007 and first half of
2008, the Bank stepped-up sterilization but soon back-pedaled as from the
second half of 2008.
Cost might have played a role in the apparent moderation of sterilization
intensity as much as the swift decline in external conditions which led to the
adjustment of the exchange rate by the bank in December of 2008. Post-2008,
increased financial system fragility also limited the ability of the CBN to
pursue aggressive sterilization.
Rolling sterilization indices also provide useful indications bout the stance of
monetary policy (Cardirelli, 2009). The lower sterilization intensities between
2008 and 2010 may therefore be interpreted as monetary easing. However,
such a reading must be done cautiously especially because the broad money
multiplier has in recent year exhibited some degree of instability.
5.0

Reflections on Policy Implications

Sterilization obviously reduces pressure from increased inflows on prices in
the domestic economy. More sterilization generally means less pressure
(demand) on the exchange rate, for example. In December 2006, the CBN
commenced direct sales of foreign exchange to BDCs and gradually increased
sterilization intensity until the second half of 2008. During the period, the
huge premium between the official exchange rate (i.e. rate at the whole-sale
Dutch Auction System) and the bureau de change rate crashed. The exchange
rate pressure remained subdued from then through the first half of 2008. As
sterilization intensity reduced thereafter, pressure on the naira exchange
intensified leading to serial depreciation of the naira exchange rate. The
pressure on the exchange rate remained elevated up to 2011 (Figure 3).
Likewise, more domestic liquidity has meant more inflation pressures to
which the CBN has had to respond during the period. However, we do not
view the decision to relax the tempo of sterilization since 2009, as of
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necessity, a bad or inefficient policy. Instead, the paper draws attention to the
fact that policy making always involves tradeoffs which need to be
appreciated. The pressure in the exchange rate market (and on consumer
prices) could therefore be seen, in part, as a necessary price for relaxing the
sterilization tempo (Table 5), unavoidably, to soothe inter-bank as well as
equities market pressures and weaknesses.
Rolling Sterilisataion Indices and Exchange Rate (2003 -2011)
160.0000

Exchange Rate

140.0000
120.0000

1
0.9
Index

100.0000

0.8

80.0000

0.7

60.0000
40.0000
20.0000

0.6

Naira Excanage
Rate
Sterilisation
Index

0.5

Figure 3: Rolling sterilization indices and exchange rate, 2003-2011
Sources: 1. CBN Annual Report (several editions) 2. CBN Statistical Bulletin
(several editions)

Second, Nigeria relies extensively on open market operations for sterilization
as compared to use of reserve requirements or transfer (withdrawal) of public
deposits from the DMBs. But, more sterilization through this means implies
more costs which can be prohibitive11. In effect, should large inflows persist
11

We did not find clear evidence that changes in the intensity of sterilization during
the period were in actual fact dictated by volume of inflow; hence the suggestion that
cost considerations may have played a key part, given the rising yields on TBs. In
addition, the entire sample period was characterized by growing concerns and
apprehensions about the health of many DMBs (segmented inter-bank) which
prompted consolidation in 2005 and other interventions to date. A highly aggressive
liquidity or sterilization operations at such a time could have had a worsening effect
on the balance sheets of the weaker banks through higher market rates. This may
have been part of the consideration to slow sterilization operations even as inflows
surged.
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over a much longer period, the ability of the CBN to sustain sterilization using
OMO could diminish markedly12. There are other reasons why a central bank
may not be able to sustain optimal use of this instrument. For example, by
preventing a decrease in the uncovered interest differential, sterilization fails
to mitigate the conditions that initially gave rise to huge inflows, and may give
rise to „increased fiscal burden‟ (Rajan, 2002; Spiegel, 1995; Calvo,
Leiderman and Reinhart, 1993; Kiguel and Leiderman 1993; Frankel, 1994,
1999). In Nigeria, indications from movements in treasury bills rates suggest
that the cost of OMO operations may have started to rise since 2009 in view
of the observed increases in TB rates (Figure 4). Obviously the quasi-fiscal
burden of sterilization in Nigeria was bound to increase given that TBs were
the main instruments used by the CBN for OMO operations13.
10.00
9.00
8.00
7.00
6.00
5.00
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00

T-Bill Rate (91 days)

Linear (T-Bill Rate (91 days))

Figure 4: Treasury Bills Rate, 2009-2011
Sources: CBN Annual Report (several editions)

Third, whatever the reasons for slacking sterilization, cost considerations or
financial system stability or both, there were consequences. Figure 3 shows

12

Calvo, et al (1993) elaborated this cost factor as follows – “The monetary authority
earns less from its investment of foreign reserves but pays higher rates on the
financial securities it sells in the domestic economy to ensure offsetting reductions in
domestic credit leading to rising „semi-fiscal costs”
13

Figure 3 shows the CBN already relenting effort at sterilization
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increased pressure on the naira exchange as sterilization intensity eased14.
Attempts by the CBN to bodily defend the naira from yielding to the pressure
have meant reserve rundown in recent times. In fact, indications were that the
share of capital inflows that became increases in foreign reserves continued to
decline. This could continue unless the necessary trade-offs are promptly
recognized and admitted.
Interestingly, central banks have other ways of sterilizing excess reserves like
raising commercial banks‟ required reserves (CRR), foreign exchange swaps,
and public sector deposit withdrawal. The reserve requirement instrument, in
particular, reduces the impact of inflows by limiting the portion that settles in
the banking system. It is cheap (when slowly remunerated) and could help
mitigate the risk of banking system descent into crisis due to large capital
inflows. In developing countries, Calvo, et al (1993), have questioned ability
of these institutions to efficiently intermediate external capital. Beyond a
certain threshold, however, the use of such instruments could lead to greater
inefficiency in the system, yet they are very useful short-term recourse when
cost becomes a key consideration.
Finally, monetary sterilization provides only temporary relief. It is unable to
permanently mitigate the risks associated to huge and persistent flows partly
because the offsetting reductions in domestic assets lead to higher domestic
interest rates relative to foreign rates. The resulting uncovered interest rate
differentials could lead to more inflows (Lee, 1997). It appears monetary
policy in Nigeria is confronting the fundamental policy tri-lemma, the
impossible trinity. It is the observation that a country can only successfully
combine any two of free capital mobility, fixed exchange rate and monetary
autonomy as part of its policy strategy. Of course, like many emerging and
developing countries today, Nigeria appears to have given up fixed exchange
rate in favour of greater capital and monetary policy freedoms. Often the
difficulty with this choice arises from the fear of floating. Even when
countries declare officially to be moving towards floating, they are often
tempted to do the opposite in practical terms, i.e., they try to manage the
exchange rate as closely as possible. This is the major difficulty. Resolving
14

Inadequate sterilization in the face of more inflows means increased transmission
of inflows to domestic liquidity which normally fuels demand for foreign exchange,
among other consequences
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the tri-lemma for a developing country like Nigeria is never an easy task
partly because monetary authorities almost permanently have to deal with the
threat of inflation. In fact, they are judged mainly on this note. In the fight
against inflation, central banks in these countries find a lot of help in keeping
the exchange rate stable. In Nigeria, the exchange rate is a focal point for
inflation expectation such that by maintaining a predetermined band within
which it manages the exchange rate, the Central Bank of Nigeria is able,
today, to reasonably anchor inflation expectation and achieve relative stability
in consumer prices. In fact some may argue that the exchange rate is the
unannounced monetary policy anchor.
6.0

Conclusion

This paper uses a simple model to measure the monetary policy responses to
the surge in capital inflows especially in the second half of the 2000s. The
study finds evidence of less-than-full, but significantly high sterilization
across the period, albeit no evidence of sterilization smoothing by the CBN.
Inflows have remained high, driven partly, perhaps, by high interest rate
differentials. In addition, the study finds evidence of slacking or declining
sterilization intensity. This, we attribute in part to the rising cost of
sterilization as measured by the increasing yields on TBs, a situation that
could soon derail or undermine the sustainability of the current approach
which is predicated on heavy reliance on market operations, and especially so
should inflows of the magnitudes observed in the past persist. Clearly,
monetary sterilization alone isn‟t enough to address fully the risks associated
with increased capital inflows in Nigeria. Perhaps, fiscal policy and some
measure of capital controls may be considered as part of the arsenal for
managing inflows. An analysis of the feasibility of each of the alternative (or
complimentary) policy responses to increased inflows in Nigeria is very
deserving, though beyond the scope of this paper.
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